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A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A
PROBLEM AT THE BIOLOGICS
FRONTIER
Erika Lietzan*
I am honored to have been asked by the editors of the University of
Illinois Law Review to comment on Professor Michael Carrier's new arti-
cle, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier.' His article-coauthored with
Carl Minniti, a recent graduate of his law school-continues a large body
of work that considers the application of antitrust law to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. In this body of work, Professor Carrier has consistently iden-
tified a variety of actions taken by innovative (and sometimes generic)
drug companies as actually or potentially collusive or anticompetitive.
These include patent litigation settlements with reverse payments or other
terms beneficial to accused infringers (called "pay for delay" by their crit-
ics), launch of newer versions of innovative products near the time of ge-
neric approval and market launch ("product hopping" by critics), deci-
sions not to provide generic competitors with samples of certain higher-
risk products for use in comparative testing unless certain conditions are
met ("REMS abuse" by critics), and certain citizen petitions that raise sci-
entific and legal concerns about pending generic drug applications ("sham
petitions" by critics).2
Professor Carrier's earlier pieces related to conventional drugs
(sometimes called "small molecule" drugs) approved under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") and their generic equivalents
approved under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the same statute. In
his latest article, Professor Carrier begins the process of extending his
analysis to a new marketplace for medicines made possible by a 2010
amendment to the Public Health Service Act ("PHSA")-the market-
place for biosimilar and interchangeable biologics.3 Biologics are
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. Iam gratleful to Krista Carver,
David Korn, Kristina Lybecker, and Mark Schulz for comments.
1. Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti, III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1 (2018).
2. E.g., Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing
Dimension ofProduct Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009 (2010); Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen
Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REv. 305 (2016); Michael A. Carrier, Pay-
mentAfterActavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7 (2014); Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hop-
ping: A New Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167 (2016).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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meaningfully different from small-molecule drugs, and the rules and prac-
tical considerations that govern the development, FDA approval, reim-
bursement, promotion, and market uptake of biosimilar and interchange-
able biologics may be like nothing antitrust scholars and courts have seen
before. Professor Carrier's new article is the first to seriously grapple with
application of antitrust law to this new marketplace made possible by the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 ("BPCIA").
His article proceeds methodically through seven issues that have at-
tracted antitrust scrutiny in the small-molecule setting. With respect to
each, Carrier predicts the likelihood that conduct he views as problematic
in the small-molecule setting will arise also in the biologics setting, and he
offers an antitrust assessment. On the one hand, he predicts fewer reverse-
payment settlements, less "product hopping," and fewer of the types of
citizen petitions that concern him. On the other hand, he predicts "ma-
nipulation" of the patent-litigation scheme by innovators, disparagement
of biosimilars by innovators, and price collusion between biosimilar com-
panies and innovators.' He also predicts that FDA will continue to require
access and distribution restrictions for high-risk biologics and assumes that
some innovators will refuse sales of restricted products. As far as antitrust
analysis is concerned, he generally argues for "robust" scrutiny in each
case "similar to what courts have applied in the small-molecule setting,"
though he would permit a more deferential analysis of innovator citizen
petitions, owing to their likely complexity in this setting.
The article makes a profound initial contribution to a new area of
scholarship. But Professor Carrier's article, like my own earlier piece on
the marketplace and like this response, is inherently speculative. FDA has
approved only a handful of biosimilar biologics, and it has not approved
any interchangeable biologics.9 The new biologics framework is different
4. See generally Carrier, Antitrust Frontier, supra note 1, at 4-11, 14-19. Biologics are often man-
ufactured in, composed of, or derived from, living systems. They are usually much larger at the molecular
level -as many as 1,000 times larger-than non biological drugs. They are also structurally more complex
and sometimes not well characterized. A biologic's mechanism of action may not be understood, and
the relationship between its structural attributes and clinical performance may not be understood. And,
unlike most small-molecule drugs, biological products can stimulate an immune response in the body.
This response can affect both product effectiveness and patient safety, in varying and unpredictable
ways. As a result of these differences, FDA's regulatory approach to biologics license applications
("BLAs") has always been different from its regulatory approach to small-molecule new drug applica-
tions ("NDAs"), and the scientific and regulatory framework for biosimilars is nothing like the scientific
and regulatory framework for generic drugs. See generally Erika Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters of Com-
petition and Innovation in Biological Medicines, 44 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 (2017).
5. Carrier, Antitrust Frontier, supra note 1, at 25, 30, 58.
6. Id. at 39. 69. 72. He uses the phrase "regulatory abuse" as the label for this "manipulation" of
the patent provisions.
7. Id. at 52.
8. Id. at 4, 20.
9. See FDA, Purple Book: Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product Exclu-
sivity and Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Development
ApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologic
Applications/Biosimilars/ucm4ll4l8.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2017)) (showing seven approval biosimi-
lar biologics and no approved interchangeable biologics).
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from the Hatch-Waxman framework, uncertain at this early stage, and
likely to vary (from one product to another) and evolve (as time passes).1
We are making our best judgments about the nature of a still emerging
marketplace and likely conduct in that marketplace based on our under-
standings of a new regulatory framework that is itself still emerging, the
broader legal landscape that includes reimbursement law and state law
(among other things), and intellectual property law. We disagree about
the likelihood of particular fact patterns arising in the first instance, and
where we agree, our explanations for their emergence are sometimes dif-
ferent. It may be premature to offer antitrust assessments about those fact
patterns, particularly when the nature of the marketplace itself remains so
profoundly uncertain. There is a substantial risk of minimizing, or even
overlooking, factors that will inform business decisions or affect their im-
pact in the marketplace.
To continue the metaphor of the article's title, it may be too soon to
send the antitrust sheriffs to the frontier. To illustrate this point, I dis-
cuss three factors that may merit greater attention than they receive in
Professor Carrier's article: (1) FDA's existing regulatory authorities, (2)
the means by which biosimilar companies will compete and achieve mar-
ket share, and (3) the stacking of the premarket patent-litigation scheme
against innovative companies. Disparagement, product hopping, and pa-
tent scheme manipulation, respectively, may take on a different light when
these factors are considered. In addition, one of the most significant unre-
solved questions is whether biosimilar companies will choose to market
biosimilar biologics or instead interchangeable biologics. Professor Car-
rier's article sensibly focuses on biosimilar biologics, which are all FDA
has approved to date. But a marketplace containing interchangeable bio-
logics may be very different as these products have more expensive mar-
keting applications, receive exclusivity, and may achieve market penetra-
tion differently." Surely the competitive landscape will be different in
ways we cannot fully imagine at this stage.
Rather than offering antitrust assessments of fact patterns that have
not yet materialized in the biologics market, I suggest that we focus on a
different issue. The risk in the new world wrought by the BPCIA may not
be the lack of competition, but rather a reduction in some types of inno-
vation. We should be closely monitoring innovation in the years ahead.
I. THE ROLE OF FDA
Federal law gives FDA ample authority to address many of the issues
that concern antitrust critics of the innovative industry. In some cases, for
instance, the agency may be able to remove or mitigate the impediments
10. See Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters, supra note 4 (discussing the variability and dynamic nature
of the biologics framework).
11. Lietzan, Uncharted Waters, supra note 4, at 41-44.
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to generic drug approval and market entry that result naturally from a law-
ful business decision made by an innovator.
For instance, FDA may have untapped flexibility to accommodate
generic and biosimilar applicants who are unable to secure samples of the
innovative product for purposes of product testing.1 2 Innovators whose
drugs are subject to use or distribution restrictions due to special safety
risks sometimes refuse to provide those drugs to third parties for use in
product development, unless their conditions (relating to safety protocols
but typically also liability coverage) are met. 13 Professor Carrier believes
this is anticompetitive.14 But FDA may be able to solve the problem-for
generic applicants and for biosimilar applicants. As for generic drugs, the
agency has repeatedly indicated that it has the flexibility to work with ge-
neric applicants where the innovator's drug is no longer available." In-
deed, there are approved generic drugs that were never tested against a
reference product.6 As for biosimilars, FDA announced three years ago
that the bulk of an applicant's comparative testing can be performed with
a comparator product purchased outside the United States and thus be-
yond the scope of any U.S.-imposed use or distribution restrictions." Fig-
uring out a regulatory solution-for both small-molecule generic drugs
and biosimilar biologics-may be tricky, but more thinking needs to be
done before critics jump to forcing sales through antitrust law or
standalone legislation.1
12. See Erika Lietzan, A Second Look at the CREATES Act: What's Not Being Said, 17 FED. Soc.
REV. 28 (2016).
13. See Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corporation's Motion to Dismiss, Mylan Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. v. Celgene Corporation, Case No. 2:14-CV-2094-ESMAH (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014) (noting
that the company had sold Thalomid to competitors that satisfied its "safety, reputational, business, and
liability concerns").
14. Carrier, Antitrust Frontier, supra note 1, at 50.
15. E.g., 79 Fed. Reg. 60852 (Oct. 8, 2014) (advising that ANDA applicants unable to obtain a
particular reference product "should contact the Office of Generic Drugs for a determination of what is
necessary to show bioavailability and same therapeutic effect"); 79 Fed. Reg. 49327 (Aug. 20, 2014); 76
Fed. Reg. 7219 (Feb. 9, 2011); 71 Fed. Reg. 2047 (Jan. 12, 2006); 75 Fed. Reg. 36419 (June 25, 2010).
16. Prior to 1997, antibiotics were approved under section 507 of the statute. Generic antibiotics
reached the market through a "monograph" procedure; the agency issued a standard of identity in a
regulation (also known as a "monograph"), and a generic applicant demonstrated in its abbreviated new
drug application ("ANDA") that its product conformed to that monograph. See generally 21 C.F.R. part
146 (1996). In 1997 Congress repealed section 507 and deemed antibiotic applications to be approved
under section 505. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act ("FDAMA"), Pub. L. No. 105-
115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997); id. at § 125(d) (uncodified). Today, pre-1997 generic antibiotics hold approved
ANDAs under section 505(j), but they were never compared with a reference product.
17. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009 8 (Apr.
2015).
18. It is possible that, when an innovator's product is no longer available, FDA has steered generic
applicants towards use of section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA, which provides a more flexible pathway to
market than the conventional generic drug application. In connection with innovator drugs under use
and distribution restrictions, though, the agency has recently signaled it might permit use of foreign-
purchased versions of the reference product. See Brenda Sandburg, REMS Barriers: US FDA Takes
"Foundational Step" to Improve Generic Access, PINK SHEET (Nov. 8, 2017), https://pink.
pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PSI21923/REMS-Barriers-US-FDA-Takes-Foundational-Step-To-
Improve-Generic-Access. Whether this would be consistent with the statute needs to be analyzed.
22 [2018
Spring] SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM 23
To give another example," current law does not permit an innovator
to raise scientific or regulatory issues that could affect a pending applica-
tion unless the innovator submits a citizen petition.2 FDA could mitigate
this problem by adopting the European practice of issuing product-class
specific guidelines once a few applicants have sought meetings requesting
scientific advice.2 1 If the agency created a docket for each product class,
innovators could present their findings and concerns without having to file
formal petitions. Using guidance dockets would also allow the key scien-
tific issues to be vetted in a transparent public process in accordance with
the agency's preferred timeline. Biosimilar companies would presumably
also benefit if a transparent process about application requirements re-
placed the current approach of providing scientific guidance in closed door
meetings with individual applicants.
Just as federal law may give FDA the power to remove impediments
to biosimilar approval and market entry, it may give the agency power to
regulate conduct of concern to antitrust critics. Consider "disparagement"
by way of example. Because biosimilar biologics are not substitutable,
competition between biosimilars and innovative biological products will
require marketing to differentiate the products. Professor Carrier's con-
cern is that head-to-head marketing increases the chances that innovators
will exaggerate the differences between the products, intimidate prescrib-
ers by raising the specter of tort liability, or even simply provide false in-
formation about biosimilars.2 2
Under FDA's well-established rules governing advertising and pro-
motion of drugs and biologics, however, neither the innovator nor the bi-
osimilar company may claim that there are clinically meaningful differ-
ences between the two products. This would be inconsistent with the
standard of approval for the biosimilar product. 2 3 This means FDA would
not permit claims that a biosimilar product was less safe or less effective
than the innovative product for its approved conditions of use. Even if the
trials detected differences between the products that did not preclude ap-
proval as a biosimilar, neither company could point to those differences
and suggest clinically meaningful differences between the products. Fur-
ther, FDA regulations require that comparative claims-whether express
or implicit-must be supported by "substantial evidence" or "substantial
clinical experience. "24 The agency traditionally has required at least one
19. See, e.g., Krista Carver, Erika Lietzan, & Jeffrey Elikan, An Unofficial Legislative History of
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009,65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 740-42 (2010).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
21. Id. at 693; see also Lictzan, Uncharted Waters, supra note 4, at21-22 (noting that the European
Medicines Agency has been revising the class-specific guidance documents as the science evolves).
22. Carrier, New Antitrust Frontier, supra note 1, at 59.
23. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(2) (2017) (requiring that promotional labeling be consistent with the
approved package insert); see also Lietzan, Uncharted Waters, supra note 4, at 30-31; see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 352(a) (deeming a drug misbranded if its labeling is "false or misleading" in any particular).
24. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(6)(ii) (deeming advertising false or misleading if it contains a "drug com-
parison that represents or suggests that a drug is safer or more effective than another drug in some
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head-to-head comparative trial establishing the propositions in question.25
For these reasons, traditional innovator-style advertising and pro-
motion, focusing on product features and clinical differences, are unlikely
to drive biosimilar market penetration.2 6 Biosimilars are likely to compete
on the basis of price instead.27
These are meaningful rules.2 8 Despite recent First Amendment deci-
sions and some indication the agency is reevaluating its regulation of truth-
ful and nonimisleading medical product communications,2 9 the agency has
never been a lackadaisical enforcer of its advertising and promotion rules.
Further, FDA will investigate complaints about conduct that are submit-
ted by a company's competitor or member of the public. Misbranding a
product can lead to criminal liability as well as civil liability, and enforce-
ment action can sometimes trigger lawsuits and enforcement actions under
other federal and state laws.30 The larger and more established companies
that develop innovative biologics (and biosimilars, for that matter) have
extensive experience complying with these rules as well as a high level of
sensitivity to enforcement action. They are unlikely to risk enforcement
action by suggesting clinically meaningful differences between the prod-
ucts or implying that biosimilar biologics in themselves raise safety con-
cerns that innovative products do not raise.
What innovators may do, however, is educate patients and prescrib-
ers about the biosimilar regulatory pathway and perhaps even the data
that were submitted in a particular biosimilar application. This is appro-
priate because the labeling will be silent. FDA has decided to require that
each biosimilar bear labeling that copies the corresponding innovator
product labeling, i.e., that this product be labeled with descriptions of the
particular when it has not been demonstrated to be safer or more effective in such particular by substan-
tial evidence or substantial clinical experience").
25. See Stefanie A. Doebler, Comparative Claims: Learning from FDA Warning Letters and Un-
titled Letters, REGULATORY FOCUS (Nov. 2012), at 2-3 (giving numerous examples where FDA took
enforcement action against comparative claims, citing lack of substantial evidence).
26. Lietzan, Uncharted Waters, supra note 4, at 31; see id. at 31-41.
27. This price competition will not look like the price competition between generic small-molecule
drugs and innovative small-molecule drugs. Generic drugs are much less expensive because they are
comparatively cheap to develop and produce. Biosimilar applications generally require extensive and
expensive marketing applications, and as a result biosimilars may not be offered at substantial discounts.
Id. at 12-21 (discussing contents of application), 31 (discussing cost savings).
28. Moreover, they are not the only considerations. The product disparagement of concern to Pro-
fessor Carrier is garden variety misrepresentation, for which there are numerous private and public
remedies. For instance, the Lanham Act provides a private cause of action for unsupported claims that
lead to competitive harm. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45, prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in commerce. State unfair competition laws may
allow recovery. E.g., California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-17210 (prohibiting "unfair
competition" which includes "any ... unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising").
29. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin Pharma. Inc. v. FDA, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: MEDICAL PRODUCT
COMMUNICATIONS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FDA-REQUIRED LABELING-QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS (draft) (Jan. 2017).
30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333 (2012) (authorizing civil injunctions and criminal prosecution).
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trials performed by the innovator on the innovator's product.3 1 The bio-
similar company may have performed extensive clinical testing, with clin-
ical endpoints, but the results of these studies are not described for pre-
scribers. This is relatively unprecedented for medical products, and the
fact that the labeling does not describe the studies that were performed on
the product may come as a surprise to these prescribers. It is not unrea-
sonable to believe it important to educate physicians about the regulatory
pathway for biosimilars and the studies that were actually performed of
the products they will prescribe.
Innovators might also educate patients and prescribers about the dif-
ferences between biosimilarity and interchangeability and about the con-
cerns that have been raised (by Congress, FDA, and others) regarding im-
munogenic reactions when patients are switched from one protein to
another protein that is similar but not identical.32 This does involve talk-
ing about safety concerns, but these concerns are not associated with the
use of a biosimilar per se; rather, they relate to switching from one product
to the other or alternating between the products. It would be a serious and
dangerous mistake for scholars and courts to confuse discussion and warn-
ing about immunogenicity, which is a real and terrifying possibility that
motivated a special and separate standard for automatic substitution of
biologics, with disparagement of the biosimilar. Even seemingly minor
manufacturing changes to a product can trigger life-threatening immune
reactions. For instance, when Johnson & Johnson made a minor manufac-
turing change to Eprex (recombinant human erythropoietin) in the late
1990s, patients using the subcutaneous dosage form of the product devel-
oped pure red cell aplasia, a condition in which the bone marrow stops
producing red blood cells.33 Educating the healthcare community about
the immunogenicity concerns that prompted a special standard for auto-
matically substitutable biologics-and the fact that a particular product is
a biosimilar and has not been found interchangeable-is fully consistent
with the statutory and regulatory framework, which precludes an inter-
changeability rating until these safety concerns have been addressed. 34 To
the extent this sort of public education campaign prompts prescribers to
be cautious about switches, it affects the innovative product as well be-
cause the same concerns would counsel against switching any treatment-
naive patients who had started on the biosimilar biologic.
31. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, LABELING FOR BIOSIMILAR PRODUCTS (Mar.
2016). The statute does not require this. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2012), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)
(A)(v).
32. See generally FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, IMMUNOGENICITY ASSESSMENT FOR THER-
APEUTIC PROTEIN PRODUCTS (Aug. 2014); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, SCIENTIFIC
CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 16-18 (Apr. 2015).
33. See Lictzan, Uncharted Waters, supra note 4, at 9-10 (discussing this experience); see also John-
son & Johnson. Comment Letter on the Passage of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
of 2009, at 2, 3 (Dec. 23, 2010). See generally Katia Boven ct al., Epoetin-Associated Pure Red Cell Apla-
sia in Patients with Chronic Kidney Disease: Solving the Mystery, NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS
TRANSPLANTATION, Sept. 2006, at iii33, iii34.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4).
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The role of FDA at the new "frontier" should not be overlooked. It
should inform predictions about likely fact patterns. It should also inform
assessment of those fact patterns. Before antitrust law-or Congress, act-
ing because of perceived deficiencies in antitrust law-steps in to attach
liability to company decisions or force changes in company decision-mak-
ing, the agency needs to explore the flexibility that its current statute and
regulations may provide to reduce burdens on applicants and speed prod-
ucts to market. Although the agency may have lacked the inclination or
incentive in the past to solve these problems itself, if its policies or prac-
tices impede competition-or could be revised to enhance competition-
then the first steps at the new frontier should be regulatory.
II. MEANS OF COMPETING AND ACHIEVING MARKET PENETRATION
Concerns about anticompetitive behavior in the small-molecule drug
marketplace generally focus on company decisions and conduct that pre-
vent or delay FDA approval of generic drugs, on the one hand, or block
or slow generic drug uptake in the market, on the other hand. The latter
theories frequently turn on the generic industry's business model. A con-
ventional generic drug is, by definition, therapeutically equivalent.35 When
a prescriber specifies an innovative product, state pharmacy law generally
leads the dispensing pharmacist to substitute the therapeutically equiva-
lent generic drug. 6 Generic companies generally do not market their prod-
ucts except through the distribution of product and price catalogs.
Professor Carrier and others use the phrase "product hopping" to re-
fer to an innovator's development and introduction of another version of
its approved product-for instance, a new dosage form, a new active in-
gredient (such as a new salt or ester, in the case of a small-molecule drug),
or a new combination product.37 The term "product hopping" is pejorative,
and the complaint is that newer versions of the innovator's product impede
generic drug market penetration. Specifically, after the innovator intro-
duces its new product, physicians prescribe the newer innovative product
(without a generic equivalent), rather than the older innovative product
(with a generic equivalent). Thus, substitution never happens. Through
this incremental innovation (also sometimes called "evergreening" by its
detractors), the argument goes, the innovator inappropriately extends its
dominant market position past the end of any intellectual property rights
on the first version of its product.
35. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (containing a required showing in a generic drug applica-
tion), with FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCES WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS vii
(37th ed. 2017) (containing standards for a finding of therapeutic equivalence).
36. See New York v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing variation in state substi-
tution laws).
37. E.g., Michael Carrier, A Real World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Di-
mension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009. 1016-1017 (2010).
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Professor Carrier advocates here and elsewhere for a "no-economic-
sense" test, pursuant to which an innovator would be presumed to have
anticompetitive intent if its incremental innovation makes no economic
sense except insofar as it impairs competition.3 1 Courts and scholars do
not, however, universally agree that incremental innovation should give
rise to antitrust liability simply because the innovator's second-generation
product wins sales away from the generic copies of the innovator's first-
generation product.39 The response to critics has always been that: (a) in-
cremental innovation never precludes approval of a generic drug that cop-
ies the first innovative product, (b) generic companies choose to rely on
automatic substitution but could in fact market their products, and (c) ra-
tional payers and physicians will select the generic first-generation product
if the innovative second-generation product is not meaningful better.
Professor Carrier believes that changes to innovative biologics are
likely to be based on innovations that make economic sense, in any case,
and he therefore sees less potential for antitrust violations in the biologics
framework."' I share his view about the type of innovation likely in the
wake of enactment of biosimilar law, but my reasoning is different. And
because my reasoning is different, I have a very different view of the im-
plications. I think the real risk is a decline in important medical innovation.
The landscape in which biologics innovators choose whether and how
to innovate will be fundamentally different from the landscape confront-
ing small-molecule drug innovators. For instance, a biosimilar applicant
may not deviate from the innovator's conditions of use.4 1 In contrast, the
drug statute allows a generic competitor to file what is known as a
"505(b)(2) application" and propose variations of the innovator's prod-
uct. 42 In other words, the generic applicant may rely on the innovator's
data and itself propose different features (a new dosage form, a new route
of administration) or a modification to the active ingredient (such as a new
salt). 4 3 A drug innovator always faces the risk of competition from a ge-
neric company that has beaten it to the punch with a slightly tweaked mol-
ecule. But biosimilar companies have no option to introduce modifications
to the innovative product using an abbreviated application. A biosimilar
company must replicate the innovator's biologic as it appears in the
38. E.g., Michael Carrier & Steve Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 167 (2017).
39. E.g., Mylan Pharms. v. Warner Chilcott, 838F.3d 421 (3d Cir.2016) (affirming summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant in case involving three reformulations of Doryx@ (doxycycline hyclate) com-
bined with ceasing sales of, and buying back, prior formulations, and promotion of the new formula-
tions); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren Wong-Ervin, & Joshua Wright, Product Hopping and the Limits of
Antitrust: The Danger of Micromanaging Innovation, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Dec. 2015) (arguing
that product hopping should be per se lawful absent objective evidence that the second product is a
"sham innovation with zero or negative consumer welfare effects").
40.Carrier, Antitrust Frontier, supra note 1, at 33-34.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III) (2012).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2012).
43. Id.; see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION
505(B)(2) (Oct. 1999).
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marketplace, on the one hand, or file a biologics license application with
the full complement of laboratory, animal, and clinical trials, on the other
hand.4 4 In practice, this means that if there are any modified products on
the market, they will be the subject of a full-blown application-most
likely the innovator's.
At the same time, the biologics statute does not provide exclusivity
for new conditions of use. Whether they are proposed in standalone ap-
plications or in supplements to previously approved applications, new in-
dications, routes of administration, dosing schedules, dosage forms, deliv-
ery systems, delivery devices, and strengths receive no data exclusivity of
their own-even if supported by clinical trials.45 Put another way, barring
patent protection, when the twelve-year exclusivity on the first-generation
product expires, a biosimilar applicant may copy not only the first-gener-
ation product but any other innovations the innovator has introduced in
the intervening years-the new dosage forms, the new routes of admin-
istration, any new uses it has discovered, and so forth.46 This should steer
innovators away from engaging in this sort of research and development,
even if it would be productive and yield dividends for the public health,
particularly towards the end of the exclusivity term on the original prod-
uct. Structural changes to the active ingredient will be handled differently.
A structural change that results in a clinical difference yields an entirely
new reference product with its own twelve-year period of exclusivity.47
The regulatory exclusivity provisions steer innovators to invest in the de-
velopment of structural modifications that have the potential to be clini-
cally meaningful, instead of new conditions of use that could be clinically
meaningful.
This language was enacted in response to concerns about "product
hopping. But we must be candid about the price that has been paid. To
prevent supposed "product hopping," policy-makers abandoned new uses
for approved drugs-even though some new uses make profound contri-
butions to the public health.49 Policy-makers also abandoned other new
44. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (full application), § 262(k) (biosimilar application); Lictzan, Uncharted Wa-
ters, supra note 4, at 58.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7).
46. Where new features of a product-like new dosage forms-are patent-protected, the "must
copy" aspect of the biosimilar pathway will protect the innovation. If the innovation is a new use, how-
ever, the biosimilar biologic will simply be approved without the new use in its labeling, and it may be
prescribed and dispensed "off label," meaning for the use that was omitted.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(1). There are many open questions about interpretation of this
provision, including some relating to the phrase "structure of the product" (instead of "structure of the
active ingredient"). FDA's view is that this phase means structure of the active ingredient. See FDA,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY FOR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS FILED
UNDER SECTION 351(A) OF THE PHS AcT 5-6 (Aug. 2014) (giving examples that are, exclusively, mod-
ifications to active ingredient, such as differences in amino acid sequence and pegylation).
48. E.g., Carver, supra note 19, at 764-66, 791-96.
49. See, e.g., Richard N. Spivey et al., New Indications for Already-Approved Drugs: Time Trends
for the New Drug Application Review Phase, 41 CLIN. PHARM. & THER. 368, 368-69 (1987) (discussing
numerous examples of major therapeutic advances realized after a drug has initially been approved,
"often for an indication unrelated to the major breakthrough").
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conditions of use, like new dosage forms-even though these, too, can play
an important public health role. Consider, for instance, an oral solution of
a new drug that was first approved in solid oral dosage form (such as a
capsule). The new dosage form may be the only way the new medicine can
be made available to additional patient populations, like children, the el-
derly, and anyone with difficulty swallowing (after a stroke, perhaps). But
policy-makers walked away from these innovations because critics of the
industry persuaded them that "product hopping" was a concern. Further,
the approach taken in the legislation could even discourage important
structural modifications. Putting aside pegylation (which reliably increases
the half-life of a molecule), it may be impossible to predict the clinical sig-
nificance of molecular modifications before investing the time and money
in clinical trials, and it may be difficult to prove that a structural change
"results in" a clinical difference, given how poorly we understand the
mechanism of action of some biological products.o Some important struc-
tural innovations may be left on the shelf.
Assuming the engine of incremental innovation does not grind to a
halt, it is hard to see how any changes could be exclusionary in the biolog-
ics framework. Again, the heart of the complaint against "product hop-
ping" has always been that incremental changes to the innovator's product
interfere with generic drug market penetration, because physicians switch
to use of the newer innovative product, which defeats the generic business
model of relying on automatic substitution for the older innovative prod-
uct. Regardless of whether one agrees that this should give rise to antitrust
liability in the small-molecule-drug setting, the factual foundation for the
complaint evaporates without the generic entry model. Unlike generic
drugs, biosimilar biological products do not receive market share through
automatic substitution. A biosimilar must be prescribed by the treating
physician.52 Moreover, in the biologics marketplace, payers will play a key
role in the choice of medicine for any particular patient. This is why
most people expect biosimilar companies will brand and market their
products to payers.
The result is brand-to-brand competition. As compared to the inno-
vator's first-generation product, the biosimilar company can offer modest
cost savings. 4 As compared to the innovator's second-generation product,
however, the biosimilar company may have the option to argue that the
50. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(ll).
51. The PHSA deems "interchangeable" biologics-not biosimilar biologics-substitutable. 42
U.S.C. § 262(i). State pharmacy laws, in turn, authorize substitution of interchangeable biologics, not
biosimilars. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 24, § 2549A (2017); FLA. STA. § 465.0252 (2016); IND. CODE
§ 16-42-25-4 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWs. ch. 112. § 12EE (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1-14.3 (2013);
OR. REV. STAT. § 689.522 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17b-605.5 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
3408.04 (2013).
52. Lictzan, Uncharted Waters, supra note 4, at 25.
53. Id. at 25-26.
54. See Kristina Lybecker, Essay: When Patents Aren't Enough: Why Biologics Necessitate Date
Exclusivity Protection, 40 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1427, 1436 (2014).
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new innovative product is not the cost-effective choice -that its biosimilar
version of the first-generation product is the better choice -given the na-
ture of the changes that the innovator made. A rational payer should push
physicians and patients to biosimilars of the first-generation product un-
less the second-generation product is not only clinically superior but also
comparatively cost-effective. This would be true even if the innovator re-
moved its own first-generation product from the marketplace. Removing
the first-generation product should have no impact on the biosimilar up-
take, because substitution plays no role in this marketplace. But because
biosimilar applicants seem inclined to provide only modest discounts in
the immediate term,5 and because biosimilar market share will depend on
competition rather than automatic substitution, innovators may continue
marketing their first-generation products even after biosimilar market en-
try. In this case, the introduction of a second-generation innovative prod-
uct will simply give physicians and payers a third product in the class from
which to select.
It is not clear if any of this depends on when the innovator introduces
its second-generation product. To be sure, some physicians who switch
their patients to the second-generation innovative product will be hesitant
to switch those patients to the biosimilar of the first-generation product,
due to the heightened risk of immunogenicity from repeat switches. This
will depend on the biological product-including the incidence and type
of immunogenicity it is thought to trigger and the impact of that immuno-
genicity -as well as the nature of the differences between the first and sec-
ond-generation products. But if the immunogenicity profile of a product
gives rise to switching concerns in the first instance, it is less likely physi-
cians will migrate those patients from the innovative first product to the
innovative second product in the first instance. In these situations, innova-
tors are especially unlikely to withdraw the first-generation products from
the market.
III. STACKED PATENT-LITIGATION PROVISIONS
Finally, commentators have not fully grappled with the bias in the
premarket patent-litigation provisions of the 2010 legislation. The patent
scheme is fundamentally, and by design, stacked against the innovating in-
dustry. Decades of allegations that small-molecule innovators misuse the
Hatch-Waxman patent-litigation provisions prompt Professor Carrier and
others to predict that biologics innovators will find a way to "manipulate"
the premarket patent process for biologics. But these concerns make no
sense once the true nature of the scheme is laid bare. The dice are loaded
55. E.g., Nicholas Florko, Remicade Biosimilar to Launch in November, 15% Cheaper Than Inno-
vator, INSIDE HEALTH POLICY (Oct. 17,2016); Ben Hirschler, Novartis Launches First U.S. 'Biosimilar'
Drug at 15 Percent Discount, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015).
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in favor of biosimilar applicants. Patent owners could not manipulate the
scheme to their advantage, even if they wanted to.
The issues in the Hatch-Waxman setting ultimately stem from its stay
provision. Section 505 of the FDCA precludes the agency from approving
a generic drug application for thirty months, if the patent owner or NDA
holder brings a suit against the generic applicant within forty-five days of
receiving notice of a patent challenge." For nearly twenty years after the
scheme was enacted, the statute imposed a stay every time suit was
brought following notice of a patent challenge, even if the challenge re-
lated to a patent issued by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
while the generic application was pending before FDA.57 This meant that
a generic application could be stayed more than once, which was contro-
versial. Some argued that innovators delayed the issuance of their patents
at PTO to make sequential stays possible, and some argued that innova-
tors improperly listed patents that were not eligible for listing.8 The stat-
ute has since been amended to mostly eliminate sequential stays," but the
history prompts Professor Carrier to speculate about potential abuse of
the biologics patent-litigation provisions by biologics innovators.6 0
These possibilities are remote. It will not be possible, for instance, for
an innovator to assign its patents to a third party (so as not to disclose the
patents during the "patent dance") and later secure reassignment to bring
a surprise lawsuit. 1 During the legislative negotiations that led to enact-
ment of the BPCIA, stakeholders spent a great deal of time worrying
about third-party patent owners, who were thought to be more common
for biologics than small-molecule drugs.6 2 The final statute addresses
them directly. After a biosimilar company files its application, there is an
exchange of information between the biosimilar applicant and the innova-
tor, during which the latter must identify not only relevant patents it owns
but also relevant patents for which it holds an exclusive license. To en-
sure that third-party patents were listed at this time, Congress also
amended the Patent Act to provide that the owner of a patent that (a)
should have been included in this list and (b) was not in fact included in
the list may not bring an infringement action with respect to the biosimilar
biologic in question.6 4 As a result, assignment to a third party prior to the
56. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
58. E.g., Federal Trade Commission, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY (July 2002) [hereafter FTC STUDY].
59. In 2003, Congress amended the law to provide that generic applicants would not be blocked
by multiple (successive) thirty-month stays through the listing of additional patents while their applica-
tions were pending. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1101, 117 Stat. at 2449.
60. Carrier, Antitrust Frontier, supra note 1, at 39-44.
61. Id. at 43.
62. E.g., Carver, supra note 19, at 760 n.755, 763, 765, 771-23, 782, 791-99, 801, 803.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A)(i). The legislation even provides for third party patent owner access
to the biosimilar marketing application and manufacturing information. Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)(iii).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)(C).
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information exchange will have no effect. The patent must be listed if it is
to be enforced.
Nor is it likely that innovators will assert "submarine" patents-a pe-
jorative term that refers to patents filed before June 7, 1995 (sometimes
known as "pre-GATT" patents), which have a seventeen-year patent term
from their date of eventual issuance. By the third quarter of 2016, there
were only twenty pre-GATT applications pending that might cover an ap-
proved biological product, and it is not clear how many (if any) actually
do.66 Surely even fewer are pending now, a full year later. It is conceivable
that a few pre-GATT applications for biological products remain in the
queue at the PTO, but this simply cannot be viewed as a significant issue
going forward.
The problem with taking lessons from the Hatch-Waxman experi-
ence is that the patent schemes are fundamentally different. The real con-
cern about the biologics patent provisions should be that they are inher-
ently hostile to patent owners. Indeed, these were the patent-litigation
provisions favored by the generic industry. 7 Consider the listing process,
which has already been described. If an innovator does not place a patent
on the master list during the private exchange of information, the patent
cannot be enforced against the biosimilar.8 This "list it or lose it" provi-
sion has no precedent in any other federal law. 9 Consider also the process
65. A patent that issues today on an application filed before June 8. 1995. has a term that is the
greater of twenty years from its application date (or the date of an earlier filed application to which it
refers) or seventeen years from the patent grant. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c). This is the result of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), which implemented the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). Today, in every case, seventeen years from patent grant
will be the greater and therefore applicable patent term.
66. Oversight of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., & the Internet, ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2d Sess. (Sept. 13,2016),
at 25 (testimony of Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Direc-
tor of the United States Patent and Trademark Office) ("With regard to a certain category of the pre-
GATT applications that are not the subject-not belonging to one particular applicant, we have reduced
the number of pre-GATT applications by 80 percent, from 100 to 20."); Dennis Crouch, Pre-Gatt Ap-
plications, PATENTLYO (Sept. 15, 2016) ("One small aspect of Director Michelle Lee's testimony to
Congress was that the number of pending pre-GATT applications still pending has been reduced to only
20-not counting those owned by Gill Hyatt.").
67 The House bill contained the patent provisions from Representative Eshoo's second biosim-
ilar bill, which the innovative industry had urged. The Senate bill contained the patent provisions from
the Kennedy biosimilar bill, which the generic industry preferred. Although the bills were not confer-
enced, the Senate language was adopted. See generally Carver, supra note 19, at 798-806.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)(6)(C).
69. The list-it-or-lose-it rule pushes innovators to err on the side of including patents that might
be implicated. A recent ruling from the Federal Circuit amplifies this. Hospira submitted an application
seeking approval of a biosimilar of Amgen's Epogen (epoetin alfa). Hospira declined to provide infor-
mation about the cell culture medium used in manufacturing its biosimilar. Amgen listed three patents,
but it did not cite its patents claiming processes for culturing cells, explaining that it could not "assess
the reasonableness of asserting claims for infringement," which is the statutory standard for listing. The
trial court denied discovery on the composition of Hospira's cell culture medium, on the theory that it
was not relevant to the patents in dispute, and the Federal Circuit declined to reverse. Amgen v. Hos-
pira, 866 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The upshot of the ruling is that innovators will need to take an even
more expansive approach to listing. In brief, then, over-inclusion of patents prompted criticism in the
drug framework, see FTC STUDY, supra note 58, but it is baked into the biologics scheme.
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for identifying a short list of patents for the first phase of litigation. If ne-
gotiations fail, the parties construct the list by simultaneously swapping
their choices.7 0 But this blind swap is controlled entirely by the biosimilar
applicant, which can dictate how many patents the innovator may pro-
pose.7 1 Consider the initiation of patent litigation on the basis of patents
listed for the first phase of litigation. Where the drug statute provides a
carrot, the biologics statute wields a club. A drug innovator that brings
timely suit secures a thirty-month stay of generic approval.7 2 In contrast,
the biologics innovator must sue within thirty days to preserve its patent
rights. If it misses the deadline, it loses the ability to secure an injunction,
even if the patent is valid and infringed. 3 At best it will receive reasonable
royalties.7 4
Consider, finally, the second phase of litigation, which involves any
patents not short-listed for the first phase of litigation. The biosimilar ap-
plicant has almost complete control over which patents are placed in that
litigation because (as noted) it may select any patents that it wishes for the
first phase. The biosimilar applicant has almost complete control over the
timing of that litigation because it triggers the opportunity for this litiga-
tion when it files a notice of commercial marketing at the time of its choos-
ing.7 5 The biosimilar applicant may also have some influence on the venue
of this litigation because once it provides the notice of commercial mar-
keting it may seek a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and inva-
lidity.7 6 Finally, and most importantly, suit does not trigger an automatic
stay of FDA approval, so the innovator has no power to delay biosimilar
market entry. The biosimilar applicant's control of the patent-litigation
process makes it highly implausible that the innovator could somehow ma-
nipulate the second phase to its advantage.
IV. CONCLUSION
I would be remiss if I failed to mention perhaps the most significant
open question about the new marketplace: whether companies will seek
approval of interchangeable biologics, instead of biosimilar biologics, and
how these products will affect both incentives to innovate and competition
in the marketplace. Interchangeable biologics are subject to a different
and higher standard of approval than biosimilar biologics.7 7 Numerous
70. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5).
71. Id. See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen. U.S. _,_ (2017) ("This process gives the applicant substan-
tial control over the scope of the first phase of litigation.").
72. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
73. 35 U.S.C. §271(c)(6).
74. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8); see Sandoz, - U.S. at ("Because the applicant (subject to certain
constraints) chooses when to begin commercial marketing and when to give notice, it wields substantial
control over the timing of the second phase of litigation.").
76. Id. § 262(l)(9)(A). Nothing in the statute precludes the biosimilar applicant from providing the
notice and a complaint at the same time.
77. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4). with 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(3).
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companies are conducting the trials necessary for interchangeability de-
terminations, suggesting that we may see an influx of these products in the
medium term. An interchangeability rating indicates that the biologic is
substitutable for the innovator's product,7 8 so an interchangeable bio-
logic-not a biosimilar biologic-is analogous to a generic drug. But we
do not know whether interchangeability determinations will drive market
penetration the way small molecule therapeutic equivalence determina-
tions drive generic drug market penetration. Interchangeability ratings
could be expensive; current FDA guidance suggests that they will require
clinical switching trials.9 And, they may not be necessary. Most biological
products are administered in physician officers or hospitals, which makes
automatic pharmacy substitution less important. 0 Moreover, payers may
dictate the therapy through their formularies, pushing patients to the bio-
similar even when it lacks an interchangeability rating."
Complaints about anticompetitive behavior undertaken by small-
molecule drug innovators have focused on actions that have the effect of
either delaying generic drug approval or slowing generic drug market pen-
etration. But in the biologics context, the impediments to approval have
so far been scientific challenges and manufacturing problems.82 There is
very little information on market penetration, and there have been no
findings that any innovator has taken any unlawful step to inhibit the mar-
ket penetration of an approved biosimilar.13 Further, we do not even know
what types of product will be in the marketplace or how they will achieve
market penetration. At this point, the biosimilar scheme is so new that any
antitrust analysis necessarily operates in a fact-free zone. It is a solution in
search of a problem.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i).
79. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING INTERCHANGE-
ABILITY WITH A REFERENCE PRODUcT 9-16 (draft) (2017).
80. Lietzan, Uncharted Waters, supra note 4, at 43.
81. Id. Payers may require treatment-naive patients to begin with the less expensive biosimilar
biologic. Indeed, they might even require patients stabilized on the reference product to switch to the
less expensive biosimilar. Some biosimilar applicants now include a single switch from the innovative
product to the biosimilar product in their premarket clinical trials. Id. at 39 n.159. If that switch rules out
any significant immunogenic reactions from a single transition, payers might require stabilized patients
to switch. In these situations, an interchangeability rating would offer the biosimilar applicant no incre-
mental benefit.
82. E.g., Joanne Eglovitch, Celltrion Biosimilar is Latest to Run Into GMP Compliance Concerns,
PINK SHEET (Sept. 11, 2017), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS121507/Celltrion-
Biosimilar-Is-Latest-To-Run-Into-GMP-Compliance-Concerns; Sue Sutter, Pfizer's EPO Biosimilar
Stalls in US On Hospira Compliance Woes, PINK SHEET (June 22, 2017), https://pink.pharmaintell
igence.informabi.com/articles/2015/10/27/biosimilar-denied-hospiras-retacrit-could-head-back-to-fda-
in-first-half-2016; Sue Sutter, US FDA's Inaugural Biosimilar Review Bumpier Than First Appeared,
PINK SHEET (June 15, 2015), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.inlorma.com/PS118268/US-FDAs-inaug
ural-biosimilar-review-bumpier-than-first-appeared.
83. In the only antitrust action to date involving biosimilars, Pfizer sued Johnson & Johnson in
September 2017, arguing that the latter's "exclusionary contracts" for Remicade (infliximab) with health
insurers, hospitals, and clinics effectively prevent Pfizer from offering its biosimilar to those customers.
Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, Civ. No. 2:17-cv-04180-JCJ (complaint filed Sept. 20, 2017).
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Those planning antitrust scrutiny of hypothetical business decisions
that may or may not affect competition in the biologics framework may
well be missing the bigger picture. In addition to increasing competition,
the BPCIA was meant to preserve incentives to innovate. With its failure
to incentivize incremental innovation and its punitive patent provisions,
the scheme is more hostile to innovators and incentives for innovation
than policy-makers and the public realize. If innovation slows as a result,
we will have traded long term social welfare for short term cost savings.
